Belief revision characterizes the process of revising an agent's beliefs when receiving new evidence. In the field of artificial intelligence, revision strategies have been extensively studied in the context of logic-based formalisms and probability kinematics. However, so far there is not much literature on this topic in evidence theory. In contrast, combination rules proposed so far in the theory of evidence, especially Dempster rule, are symmetric. They rely on a basic assumption, that is, pieces of evidence being combined are considered to be on a par, i.e. play the same role. When one source of evidence is less reliable than another, it is possible to discount it and then a symmetric combination operation is still used. In the case of revision, the idea is to let prior knowledge of an agent be altered by some input information. The change problem is thus intrinsically asymmetric. Assuming the input information is reliable, it should be retained whilst the prior information should be changed minimally to that effect. To deal with this issue, this paper defines the notion of revision for the theory of evidence in such a way as to bring together probabilistic and logical views. Several revision rules previously proposed are reviewed and we advocate one of them as better corresponding to the idea of revision. It is extended to cope with inconsistency between prior and input information. It reduces to Dempster rule of combination, just like revision in the sense of Alchourron, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM) reduces to expansion, when the input is strongly consistent with the prior belief function. Properties of this revision rule are also investigated and it is shown to generalize Jeffrey's rule of updating, Dempster rule of conditioning and a form of AGM revision.
Introduction
Belief a revision depicts how an agent revises its prior beliefs when new evidence (called input) is received. Often, the input is to some extent conflicting with prior beliefs. There-fore, belief revision is a framework aiming at characterising the process of belief change, so as to accommodate new evidence and reach a new consistent set of beliefs.
Logic-based belief revision has been intensively studied since the well known AGM postulates 1 were proposed, e.g., by Katsuno and Mendelzon 17 , Darwiche and Pearl 6 , Nayak et al. 22 , Booth and Meyer 4 , Jin and Thielscher 16 , etc. Belief revision on ranked epistemic states is also receiving more and more attention nowadays, e.g., Benferhat and colleagues 3,2 , Ma and colleagues 19, 20 , etc. For numerical oriented uncertainty formalisms, Jeffrey's rule 15 is frequently referred to in probability theory. It has direct counterparts in possibility theory 6, 2 and in the ordinal conditional function framework 29, 18 . The theory of evidence, also known as Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (DS theory) 7, 24, 32 , rapidly gained a widespread interest for modeling and reasoning with uncertain/incomplete information. When two pieces of evidence are collected from two distinct sources, it is necessary to combine them to get an overall result. So far, many combination rules (e.g., Smets 28 for a review) have been proposed in the literature. These rules involve an implicit assumption that all pieces of evidence come from parallel sources that play the same role, hence they are symmetric. Especially, when a source is less important than another, the corresponding piece of information is discounted and the above symmetry assumption still applies. Combination is typically applied to pieces of information received from the "outside". However, an agent may have its own prior opinion (from the inside), and then receive some input information coming from outside. In such a case, the problem is no longer one of combination, it is a matter of revision. Revision is intrinsically asymmetric as it adopts an insider point of view so that the input information and prior knowledge play specific roles, while combination is an essentially symmetric process, up to the proper handling of unequal reliabilities of sources.
Combination and revision share a common feature: they deal with pieces of information of the same nature (for instance pieces of generic knowledge, or uncertain observations). However, two principles that do away with symmetry should guide the revision process:
(1) Success postulate: information conveyed by the input evidence should be retained after revision; (2) Minimal change: the prior belief should be altered as little as possible while complying with the former postulate.
It should be noted that new evidence (input information) can be either sure or uncertain. Furthermore, if new evidence is uncertain, uncertainty can either be part of the input information, hence enforced as a constraint guiding the belief change operation (this is the idea of the success postulate) or it is meant to qualify the reliability of the (otherwise crisp) input information 10 . In the latter case, the success postulate is questionable. In this paper, we focus on the former case, where new uncertain evidence is accepted and serves as a constraint on the resulting belief state.
In probability theory, revision strategies are studied in the context of probability kinematics 8 . Probability kinematics considers how a prior probability measure should be changed based on a new probability measure, which should be preserved after revision, on a coarser frame (a subalgebra of the probability space). Jeffrey's rule 15 is the most an event A, the weight m(E) is really construed as the probability P ({E}) on the power set of W . A mass function m is called Bayesian if and only if all its focal sets are singletons. Then it is a standard probability distribution. A mass function m is called partitioned if and only if its focal sets E 1 , · · · , E k form a partition of W , i.e., E 1 ∪ · · · ∪ E k = W and E i ∩ E j = ∅ for i = j. A mass function m is called consonant if and only if its focal sets are nested. In particular, if m has only one focal set E with m(E) = 1, it represents an epistemic state whereby all that is known is that the state of the world lies in E.
Given m, its corresponding belief function Bel 
m(E).
Plausibility and belief coincide with a probability measure when the mass function is Bayesian. A belief function is a necessity measure, i.e. Bel(A ∩ B) = min(Bel(A), Bel(B)), equivalently a plausibility function is a possibility measure, i.e., P l(A ∪ B) = max(P l(A), P l(B)), if and only if the mass function is consonant 24 . There are several conditioning methods for belief/plausibility functions 10 . The following, called Dempster conditioning is the most commonly used one 24 .
Definition 2. Let B be a subset of W such that P l(B) > 0, then the Dempster conditioning functions on B can be defined as m(A|B) = E:A=B∩E m(E) P l(B) , P l(A|B) = P l(A ∩ B) P l(B) ,
Bel(A|B) = 1 − P l(A|B) = P l(B) − P l(A ∩ B) P l(B) ,
where A = ∅ and m(∅|B) is defined as 0.
Dempster conditioning can be viewed as a revision rule that transfers the mass bearing on each subset A to its subset A ∩ B, thus sanctioning the success postulate. Moreover, resulting masses bearing on non-empty sets are renormalized via simple division by P l(B), i.e. the mass function inside B does not change in relative value, which expresses a form of minimal change. However the apparent asymmetry of the conditioning rule is due to the assumption that B is a true fact, while m involves uncertainty. It does not presuppose an intrinsic asymmetry, whereby the mass m represents the epistemic state of an agent receiving information B. Dempster conditioning can also be viewed as the symmetric fusion of uncertain pieces of evidence represented by m and a sure fact B represented by m (B) = 1.
In particular it is a special case of the well-known Dempster rule of combination defined as
which is formally a random set intersection followed by a renormalization. The status of Dempster conditioning with respect to symmetry (i.e., is it revision or combination?) is totally ambiguous. Dempster rule of combination is a symmetric extension of Dempster conditioning. The revision rule we shall advocate is an asymmetric extension thereof. Another important concept in evidence theory is the one of specialisation. It generalizes a natural notion of comparison of information content. An epistemic state A is less informed than another one B if and only if B ⊆ A: the former is a specialisation of the latter.
This notion is naturally extended to mass functions as follows: The term σ(A, B) may be seen as the proportion of the mass m (B) which is transferred (flows down) to A. Matrix Σ is called a specialisation matrix, and m is said to be a specialisation of m . Specialisation is an extension of set-inclusion to random sets. In fact, specialisation between two mass functions can be equally seen as a generalization of implication in propositional logic. That is, we have Proposition 1. Let φ and ψ be two propositions in a language such that W is its set of interpretations. Denote M od(φ) (resp. M od(ψ)) the set of models of φ (resp. ψ) and let m and m be two mass functions on W s.t. m(M od(φ)) = 1 and m (M od(ψ)) = 1 stating that proposition φ (resp. ψ) is true in m (resp. m ). If m is a specialisation of m , then φ ψ.
Proof: From Def. 3 and the fact that each of m and m only has one focal set, i.e., M od(φ) and M od(ψ), respectively, it must be σ(M od(φ), M od(ψ)) > 0 (in fact σ(M od(φ), M od(ψ)) = 1) which implies M od(φ) ⊆ M od(ψ) which is equivalent to φ ψ. 2 Example 1. Let W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }, and let m and m be two mass functions such that m({w 1 }) = 0.3, m({w 2 }) = 0.5, m({w 1 , w 2 }) = 0.1, m({w 2 , w 3 }) = 0.1, and
Then m is a specialisation of m , since m flows a mass value 0.2 from {w 1 , w 2 } to {w 1 } (i.e., σ({w 1 }, {w 1 , w 2 }) = 0.4), a mass value 0.2 from {w 1 , w 2 } to {w 2 } and a mass value 0.3 from {w 2 , w 3 } to {w 2 }. 5 on the 1st row shows the fraction of the m ({w 1 , w 2 }) that will flow down to subset {w 1 }, namely σ({w 1 }, {w 1 , w 2 }) = Note that for probability distributions specialisation is an empty concept: a probability measure is a specialisation of another if and only if they are equal. This is because a probability measure cannot convey incomplete information, contrary to an epistemic state represented by a set. Usually, informational comparison between probability measures is done via their respective entropy measures.
Revision rules
The major approach to belief revision is the one described by Gärdenfors and his colleagues 1 . Although couched in logical terms using a propositional language, its thrust is basically semantic, a closed belief set being equated to its subset of models. The axiomatic framework for the AGM revision explicitly uses the success postulate as a means of making the revision process asymmetric. The idea of minimal change is expressed in a more distributed way via the other AGM axioms. On the other hand, in probability kinematics, Jeffrey's rule 15 was also devised with a view to respect the success postulate, and the minimal change is stated as an inertia axiom (what need not change will not change). The minimal change principle has also been expressed by showing the result of Jeffrey's rule minimizes an informational distance to the prior probability 31 . In this section, we recall the AGM style revision in terms of sets of possible worlds, and describe the basics of Jeffrey's rule. Then we provide a rationale for a revision rule in evidence theory, that may, in some sense extend both types of revision.
Revising sets of possible worlds
Let E ⊆ W, E = ∅ be the prior epistemic state of an agent who knows that the actual world lies in E. Let E I ⊆ W, E I = ∅ be the input information stating that the actual world actually lies in E I , that the agent supposedly accepts as being true. There are two cases distinguished by the AGM theory:
(1) Either E ∩ E I is not empty (the two pieces of information are consistent), and the resulting epistemic state is E • E I = E ∩ E I . (2) Or E ∩ E I = ∅, (the two pieces of information are inconsistent), and the resulting epistemic state is some subset E • E I ⊆ E I .
The first situation is called expansion in the AGM theory. It is clearly symmetric and coincides with a fusion rule. The minimal change principle is at work since E is indeed minimally modified to accept E I . The second situation corresponds to what Gärdenfors and his colleagues calls genuine revision, in that the resulting epistemic state denies the prior one. The AGM axioms enforce a certain method for the choice of a suitable subset E • E I ⊆ E I . Namely, they come down to assuming that the prior epistemic state E is the visible part of a deeper knowledge made of a weak ordering on W , where by w 1 w 2 means that w 1 is more plausible than w 2 , such that E contains all the maximal elements (we say that is E-faithful). The weak order defines a well-ordered partition
w} is the set E I ∩ U i of most plausible worlds in E I .
It has been argued 9 that the existence of this plausibility ordering makes this construction ambiguous:
• One possible interpretation of the weak ordering is that it represents the agent's background knowledge expressing that in general if what is known is E I then the most plausible worlds are E • E I ⊆ E I . Then the agent possesses an explicit representation of this background knowledge in the form of rules A → B from which the weak ordering can be derived. In that case, the revision process comes down to a form of non-monotonic inference whereby the background knowledge is queried, based on the incomplete observation E, and the plausible conclusion is E • E I . But clearly the plausibility relation is not revised.
• Another interpretation is that of a fusion rule on a par between E I that is a crisp information (whereby the elements w ∈ E I are deemed impossible) and a ranked epistemic state conveying some uncertainty, resulting in the restriction of to E I , that is, not really a revision process (in fact a kind of ranked expansion).
However, the genuine revision problem is an asymmetric process of minimally changing a prior plausibility ordering , viewed as a refined description of an epistemic state by means of another input plausibility ordering I , that must be respected. In this setting the AGM axioms must be lifted to the revision of ranked epistemic states. There are works on the latter topic (see Dubois 9 for some bibliography). We adopt this view in this paper. However, in this subsection, we assume that the well-ordered partitions reduce to (E, E) for , and (E I , E I ) for the input weak order. Then the AGM revision of E by E I reduces to:
Note that this revision rule also underlies a principle of minimal commitment: Any result of E • E I of the form A ⊂ E I makes sense when input and prior are inconsistent, and is of the AGM style: the ordering of possible worlds induced by the AGM axioms explains how to select the subset A. However if this ordering is not available then it is cautious to consider E • E I = E I . While we will be using the above revision rule in the sequel, all definitions of revision rules below can be adapted to the case where E • E I is the subset of most plausible worlds in E I dictated by an E-faithful plausibility relation .
Revising probability distributions
Jeffrey's rule applies when the two weak orders and I are encoded as probability distributions P (the prior epistemic state) and P I respectively. Jeffrey's rule was introduced as follows.
Definition 4. Let P be a probability measure over W denoting and P I be a probability measure over a partition {U 1 , · · · , U n } of W denoting the input evidence. Let • J denote Jeffrey's rule. Then, ∀A ⊆ W :
Some axioms guide the revision process carried out by Jeffrey's rule. The success postulate writes:
It is clear that the coefficient P I (U i ) represents what the probability of U i should be, and not (for instance) uncertainty about the reliability of piece of information P I (U i ).
Note that for w ∈ U i , Jeffrey's rule (3) can be simplified as
That is, the revised probability of element w within each U i is the same as its prior probability in relative value. More generally, the probability of any event A conditional to any uncertain event U i in this subalgebra is the same in the original and the revised epistemic states. Namely,
The minimal change principle expressed by the constraint of Eq. (6) says that the revised probability measure P • J P I must preserve the conditional probability degree of any event A given uncertain event U i . Jeffrey's rule of conditioning yields the unique distribution that satisfies Eqs. (4) and (6) (see, e.g., Chan and Darwiche 5 ). The posterior probability also minimizes relative entropy with respect to the original distribution under the probabilistic constraints defined by the input P I 31 . Shafer 25 noticed that one can see the input probability function P I on the partition as a belief function on W , where the mass function is m I such that m I (U i ) = P I (U i ), ∀i. Then he proved that for each input m I , there exists a belief function with mass function m D , such that Jeffrey's rule can be written as P • J P I = m P ⊗ m D applying Dempster rule of combination (1) between the Bayesian mass m P associated to P and the mass function m D that can be built from m I . Note that this remark brings the obviously asymmetric Jeffrey's rule back to the symmetric camp of fusion rules just like it does for Dempster conditioning. Following this line, only Dempster rule of combination is needed for revision.
However, we claim that this formal result is misleading: it does not rule out the possibility of an asymmetric generalisation of Jeffrey's rule that is is more in the spirit of its inventor, that is, one that obeys the success postulate and a rule of minimal change with respect to the prior mass function, while extending Dempster conditioning.
The need for an asymmetric revision rule in DS theory
Let us look at the following example of revision problem (adapted from Jeffrey 15 ).
Example 2. An agent inspects a piece of cloth by candlelight, gets the impression it is green (m I ({g}) = 0.7) but concedes it might be blue or violet (m I ({b, v}) = 0.3). However the agent's prior belief (before using a candle) about the piece of cloth (we have no information about how this opinion was formed) was that it was violet (m(v) = 0.8) without totally ruling out the blue and the green (m(b, g) = 0.2). How can she modify her prior belief so as to acknowledge the observation?
Clearly, the input evidence has priority over the prior belief, hence after revision, we should conclude that the cloth color is more plausibly green. However, symmetric combination rules in DS theory may fail to produce this result. For example, if we apply Dempster's rule of combination, then we get m({v}) = which shows violet, in contrast with what the observation suggests, is the most plausible color, and that the situation is more confused than before getting new information. Indeed, one might expect the direct observation of the piece of cloth should result in being more informed than previously. The counterintuitive result produced by the combination rule here stems from the underlying assumption that we treat the prior belief and the input evidence on a par. Therefore, to solve the above belief change problem, the correct action is to perform revision instead of combination.
Principles of mass function based revision
Now we discuss how the two general principles of revision can be applied to massfunctions. Let • be a revision operator which computes a posterior mass functionm = m • m I from two given other mass functions, one representing the prior belief state (m) and the other representing new evidence (m I ). Moreover, we consider revision rules that generalize Jeffrey's probability kinematics, Dempster rule of conditioning and the AGMstyle revision rule (2) of epistemic states.
There are some difficulties to do so. First, we must adapt Dempster rule of conditioning to the AGM-style revision rule; the latter prescribes that if m(E I ) = 0, thenm(E I ) = 1, while it generalizes (2) whenever m(E I ) > 0. Next, it may be impossible to straightforwardly reconduct the basic axioms of Jeffrey's rule (4) and (6) to belief functions, because the expansion effect of the AGM-style revision rule does not apply to probability distributions. We propose the following basic principles for the revision of belief functions: Note that Jeffrey's rule satisfies this property, stricto sensu, if the input information is interpreted as a partitioned mass function.
A straightforward rendering of the probabilistic success postulate for belief functions does not make sense if no restriction is put on the form of m I . This is because the case of expansion never occurs for a probability function, as argued in Dubois et al. 10 : you cannot make the focal elements of a probability measure more precise via revision. On the contrary, when revising a mass function, in general, focal sets of m I will be made more precise by focal sets of m. So we cannot reconduct the success postulate (4)Bel(E) = Bel I (E) when E is any focal element of m I . One may expect that in some cases,Bel(E) > Bel I (E) (confirming E). But this is implied by the above success postulate, since specialisation is stronger than the inequality between belief functions 11 . Nevertheless, the probabilistic form (4) of the success postulate can be recovered by a suitable restriction of the form of the input belief function 26 , as seen later on. . However, the combination of independent mass functions exhibits a reinforcement effect which cannot occur in logic-based belief merging. That is, m ⊕ m = m (⊕ is a mass function combination operator) whilst applied to standard epistemic states, revision is idempotent:
For mass functions, instead of m • m = m, we may expect some reinforcement effect if the new evidence is identical to, but considered independent from, the prior beliefs. For instance we may believe to some degree that Toulouse rugby team won the European championship last year. If some friend coming from abroad says he believes it likewise, this piece of information confirms our prior belief, so that even if our opinion remains the same, we become more confident in it.
The bottom line is that there is a certain conflict between the minimal change principle and the confirmation effect when revising uncertain information. However, in the case of revising a belief function by another one that is consistent with it, one should expect that the prior information is still implied by the result of the revision. Two mass functions m 1 and m 2 are said to be strongly consistent if and only if ∀A ∈ F m1 , B ∈ F m2 , A ∩ B = ∅. A minimal requirement for minimal change is then as follows Note that this property also holds for Dempster rule of combination. It is the extension of one of the AGM postulates 1 requesting identity between expansion and revision in the case of receiving an input that is consistent with the original belief set.
A stronger form of minimal change, mimicking (6) could be the request that [m • m I ](A|B) = m(A|B) for some focal subsets A not affected by the input information m I where m I (B) > 0. In particular, if m I has focal sets forming a partition
However this kind of postulate is specific to probability distributions: any focal set of the Bayesian mass m is included into a single focal set of the partitioned mass m I . So we may adopt a counterpart to the minimal change principle (6) only in very drastic conditions:
This property cannot be used in place of EMC because its scope is very narrow, and in many situations it will hold by default because the preconditions are too drastic. On the other hand, any revision rule that violates it can be questioned. In this form it is satisfied by the AGM rule (2). Indeed, if E ⊆ E I then E • E I = E, otherwise PMC does not apply. It is also respected by Dempster conditioning. Note that the EMC postulate also has a limited scope since most of the time m and m I will not be strongly consistent. (3) Generalization of Jeffrey's rule: Since a Bayesian mass function can be seen as a probability distribution, we would expect that a mass-function-based revision rule should generalize Jeffrey's rule. The latter is idempotent since P • P = P , which involves no confirmation effect, and also satisfies minimal change in the above sense (this is Eq. (6)). There is no paradox here: a probability P is never strongly consistent with itself and its focal sets cannot be precisiated. So EMC does not apply to this case. (4) Generalization of Dempster conditioning: If m I (E I ) = 1 for some subset E I ⊆ W such that P l(E I ) > 0, thenP l = P l(·|E I ), in the sense of Dempster conditioning (this is true for Jeffrey's rule that reduces to conditioning when the input information is a sure fact). Note that Dempster rule of combination also specialises to such conditioning in this case. This is because combination and revision collapse to what Gärdenfors calls expansion when the input information is a sure fact consistent with the prior epis-temic state. In the logical setting, AGM revision becomes symmetric; however, in the evidence setting, Dempster conditioning sounds asymmetric because the input information is not uncertain, contrary to the prior epistemic state. (5) Generalization of the AGM revision Note that the Success Postulate SPBF and the Expansion Minimal Change postulate EMC for mass functions are respected by the revision (2) for epistemic states, considering them as mass functions. This rule yields the least committed result obeying both principles for epistemic states. It is thus natural to require that a revision rule in evidence theory should generalize (2).
As Dempster rule of conditioning is a special case of a revision rule, we must extend Definition 2 as follows in order to recover the AGM revision of epistemic states:
for P l(E I ) = 0 and A = E I .
Let us call this extended conditioning universal Dempster conditioning.
The corresponding conditional plausibility and belief functions are denoted by P l U (A|E I ), Bel U (A|E I ) as follows:
Compared with Definition 2, this definition is extended to the situation where P l(E I ) = 0, in which case the above universal conditioning gives an intuitive result.
It is easy to check that m U (·|E I ) is a mass function and it has an equivalent form as
where I {φ} is an indicator function such that I {φ} = 1 if φ is true and I {φ} = 0 otherwise. Similarly, P l U (A|E I ) and Bel U (A|E I ) also have equivalent forms as
Then the following is clear
for P l(E I ) = 0 and A = E I , 1 for P l(E I ) = 0 and A = E I .
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for P l(E I ) > 0, 0 for P l(E I ) = 0 and A = E I , 1 for P l(E I ) = 0 and A = E I .
where A = ∅ and m(∅|E I ) = 0.
Revision operators for mass functions
Within the scope of DS theory, the first attempt to actually generalize Jeffrey's rule to mass functions was made by Ichihashi and Tanaka 14 . They proposed three variants of this extended Jeffrey's rule they called plausible, credible and possible conditioning, respectively.
Dubois and Prade
12 argued in favor of the first one as being a natural asymmetric variant of Dempster rule of combination (see also Dubois et al. 10 ). These approaches are criticized by Smets 26 , and he makes yet another proposal where the input evidence comes in the form of a belief function on a subalgebra of W . Smets 27 emphasises the need for mass function revision strategies but proposes no concrete revision rule. Halpern 13 makes the same proposal as the one advocated by Dubois and Prade. However, he restricts the rule to input evidence in the form of a belief function that can be represented as a probability measure on a partition {U 1 , · · · , U n } of W , i.e, such that m(U i ) = α i and α i = 1.
Ideally, a mass function based revision rule should accept evidence in the form of a general mass function definable on 2 W rather than just on a partition of W . Furthermore, like the original Jeffrey's rule, all above proposals require that the prior plausibilities P l(A) be positive whenever A is a focal set of the input mass function. In other words, this rule requires that no part of the new evidence be in total conflict with the agent's current beliefs, which restricts the application of this rule. This requirement is much more drastic than the minimal consistency requirement of Dempster rule of combination for which at least one focal set of the first mass function must be consistent with another one of the other mass function. In many cases, the revision rules of Ichihashi and Tanaka cannot be applied.
In this section we generalize previously proposed extensions of Jeffrey's rule by doing away with the latter limitation, and we show that only one of them generalizes Dempster rule of conditioning and at the same time admits any kind of input.
Revision operators for belief functions: a general form
As a belief function is defined by a mass function, it is natural to express revision rules in terms of mass functions. The idea of all revision operations is to share the input masses m I (B) among a family of focal subsets F Such a form for a revision operation already ensures some properties will be fulfilled. First, we do have an extension of Jeffrey's rule. Proof: For a Bayesian prior mass function, and partitioned input mass function, F Ui m reduces then to the set of singletons with positive probability in U i and it is then obvious that σ({s}, U i ) = = m(A|B) and PMC holds. 2
Inner vs. outer revision operators
We first propose inner and outer revision operators which are named after the concepts of inner and outer probability measures, both of which are closely related to upper and lower probabilities in the sense of Dempster 7 . We define an inner revision operator denoted by • i , as follows. This change rule naturally appears as the dual of the former one. The intuition of outer revision is similar to that of inner revision except that here for any A, we flow down portions of mass values of Bs to subsets A such that A ∩ B = ∅ preserving the masses m(A) in relative value across the concerned A sets (dividing them by P l(B)). So, the outer revision is (8) with F B m = {A : A ∩ B = ∅}. Note that for outer revision, the revised result is not necessarily a specialisation of m I , since sets not included in B receive portions of mass m I (B).
Our inner (resp. outer) revision rule coincides with Ichihashi and Tanaka's credible (resp. possible) conditioning rule when Bel(B) > 0 (resp. P l(B) > 0), and extends them by addressing the revision situation where new evidence totally conflicts with prior beliefs. That is, contrary to Ichihashi and Tanaka 14 , revision can be done even when Bel(B) = 0 (resp. P l(B) = 0). However, none of these change rules respect the two basic revision postulates in the spirit of Jeffrey's rule. As a consequence they do suffer from some drawbacks.
Example 4. Let m({w 1 , w 2 }) = 1 and m I ({w 1 , w 3 }) = 1, then intuitively m supports w 1 while rejects w 3 , and hence we expect the revision result to bem({w 1 }) = 1. However, from inner revision, the revised result ism i ({w 1 , w 3 }) = 1 whilst from outer revision, the revised result ism o ({w 1 , w 2 }) = 1. None of the results are fully agreeable with intuitions. In particular, they are not in agreement with the AGM revision principles (that enforce expansion in this case). They do not extend the revision rule (2) for epistemic states.
A modified outer revision operator
As mentioned earlier, neither the inner nor the outer revision qualifies as revision operations. In particular the result of outer revision is not necessarily a specialisation of the mass function representing new evidence, but it obeys minimal change beyond what is requested, even by the AGM postulates. In this section, we modify outer revision so as to make it a specialisation of the new evidence, while respecting the EMC postulate. We define operator • om as a modified outer revision operator, that extends the third revision rule of Ichihashi and Tanaka: This modification makes the revision result truly a specialisation of m I , hence it satisfies the success postulate, but it is not exactly of the form (8) . Likewise, if m and m I are strongly consistent then it reduces to Dempster rule of combination where normalisation is not needed. So the EMC rule is also satisfied. Also, the modified outer revision extends the plausible conditioning rule 14, 12 to situations where P l(B) = 0. Note that conditions P l(B) = 0, A = B, and A ∩ B = C together imply P l(C) = 0, hence Eq. (9) can also be equivalently written as In fact this modified outer rule coincides with the AGM revision rule (2) for flat epistemic states described by sets. When P l(B) > 0, ∀B ∈ F I , Dubois and Prade 12 show that the modified outer revision rule can be expressed using Jeffrey-like equations and Dempster conditioning (Def. 2).
These results still hold if universal Dempster conditioning is used to cope with the case where P l(B) = 0 for some B ∈ F I , as proposed here. As pointed out by Dubois and Prade 12 , these Jeffrey-like equations are also formally justified by Wagner's statement 30 that the only event-wise combination valid for both plausibility and belief functions is the linear convex combination, as it is the case for probability measures.
The above properties suggest a natural name for this change rule, namely, JeffreyDempster revision rule and we can denote it by • JD .
Similarly, Halpern's belief function revision rule is defined as follows 13 .
Definition 8. Let m be a belief function over 2 W denoting the prior epistemic state and m I be a belief function such that F I = {U 1 , · · · , U n } is a partition of W denoting the input evidence. Let • H denote Halpern's revision rule, then we have
This is clearly a special case of Jeffrey-Dempster revision rule, since it is of the form (13) .
Def. 7 gives a succinct representation of the Jeffrey-Dempster revision operator, but the above expressions suggest a calculation method. It uses the same table as the one for showing how to compute Dempster rule of combination.
We build a table M in which each column stands for a focal element of m I and each row stands for a focal element of m. In each entry (A, B) of M (A is a row focal element and B is a column focal element), we put A ∩ B and a weight w(A ∩ B) computed as follows.
For each column B, if there are non-empty A ∩ B in the column, then we define w(A ∩ B) = The matrix M is as follows. 
Note that in the above matrix, since all the intersected sets in the fourth column are empty, we get m({w 3 }) = 0.2, so finally we getm = m • om m I such thatm({w 1 }) = 0.45,m({w 1 , w 2 }) = 0.35,m({w 3 }) = 0.2.
Smets revision rule
Smets 26 considers the revision of a mass function m by an input m I having a particular structure. Namely, consider a partition P = {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n } of W and let B the Boolean algebra of subsets induced by P (unions of elements in P). Assume the set F I of focal sets of m I only contains elements in B.
This revision rule is again of the form (8), but with a different F B m . Namely, for each subset A ⊆ W , define A * , the upper approximation of A with respect to P, as:
This is the upper approximation in the sense of rough sets 23 . Now let F This is easy to figure out: For B ∈ B, C⊆Bm (C) = C:C * ⊆B k C m I (C * ), where k C is the portion of m I (C * ) allocated to C in the final result. Now by construction
is shared among those of its subsets of which it is the upper approximation. So,
The price paid is a restriction on the form of the input that is questionable, namely, if two input focal sets E 1 and E 2 intersect, then their intersection is a focal set of m I . Suppose m I possesses two intersecting focal sets with m I (E 1 ∩ E 2 ) = 0. The Smets framework requires to define a partition of W such that E 1 and E 2 belong to the corresponding algebra. There is a degree of freedom here as all elements of the corresponding partition will have mass 0; the simplest is the 4-element partition induced by E 1 and E 2 . In any case, all focal sets of m included in E 1 ∩E 2 will get zero posterior mass since m I (E 1 ∩E 2 ) = 0 and they can receive no mass from Smets 26 also considers a counterpart of the inner revision rule that replaces A∩B = C by A ⊆ B in (14) . But again, it violates the minimal change principle and does not extend Dempster conditioning.
An algorithmic view of the revision rule for belief functions.
The above discussion should have convinced the reader that the most reasonable extension of Jeffrey's revision rule to belief functions among existing proposals is the JeffreyDempster revision rule, also retained by Dubois and Prade 12 in their older comparative study. In this section we provide a different view that leads to the same revision rule.
Intuitively, for mass-function-based revision, prior information that is consistent with the new information is refined by expansion. By consistent, we mean focal sets of m I that overlap the support S(m). It is an equivalence relation on F m ∪ F I , the equivalence classes of which form a partition of the set of focal sets F m ∪ F I . Denote by F 1 , . . . F k its equivalence classes when they contain more than a single focal set, and by F uncor the set of focal sets that form singleton equivalence classes. Each family F i is called a correlated group. Its focal sets can be arranged in a sequence where any two adjacent sets overlap. Clearly, any focal subset in F i is disjoint from any other subset in
where each element S i of the partition of S(m) ∪ S(m I ) corresponds to the union of focal sets in a family F i ⊂ F m ∪ F I of focal sets of both m and m I . S uncor is the union of focal sets of m which have no intersection with S(m I ) and focal sets of m I which have no intersection with S(m). In Example 7, we should have k = 2, S 1 = {w 1 , w 2 , w 8 }, and S 2 = {w 6 , w 7 } and S uncor = {w 3 } ∪ {w 4 , w 5 } = {w 3 , w 4 , w 5 }.
The above construction is in fact equivalent to computing maximal connected components in a certain non-directed bipartite graph induced by the sets of focal sets F m and those in F I . A bipartite graph is a set of graph vertices V decomposed into two disjoint sets V 1 and V 2 , such that no two graph vertices (or nodes) within the same set are adjacent. Namely, consider the bipartite graph with two sets of nodes: focal sets in V 1 = F m and those in V 2 = F I (if the same focal set appears in F m and F I it produces two nodes, one in each node set). Arcs connect one focal set A ∈ F m to one focal set B ∈ F I if and only if A ∩ B = ∅. Each S i is the union of focal sets corresponding to a maximal connected component in the graph. The set S uncor is the union of focal sets corresponding to isolated nodes in the bipartite graph. The bipartite graph for Example 7 is shown in Fig. 1 . Ma-Liu-DP JEFFREY'S RULE, AGM REVISION AND DEMPSTER CONDITIONING 21
From Fig. 1 , it is straightforward to get S 1 = {w 1 , w 2 , w 8 }, S 2 = {w 6 , w 7 } and S uncor = {w 3 , w 4 , w 5 }.
Based on the graph perspective, given two mass functions, the partition of S(m) ∪ S(m I ) into the union of mutually consistent focal sets can be obtained by Algorithm 1 with a breadth-first search algorithm used to obtain maximal connected components in the bipartite graph produced by the above procedure.
Algorithm 1 Partitioning into Correlated Groups
Require: F 1 : the set of focal sets of m, F 2 : the set of focal sets of m I . Ensure: A maximum number of correlated groups consisting of focal sets.
1: Set S uncor = ∅, k = 0; 2: while
Select a focal set A in F 1 ;
4:
if A does not overlap with any focal sets in F 2 then 5:
else 7:
8:
Let B = {B : B ∈ F i and B ∩ pre B = ∅} be the set of focal sets of m i that intersect pre B ;
10:
Let S k = B∈B B ∪ S k ; pre B = B∈B B;
11:
12: i = 3 − i; (repeatedly checking elements in F 1 and F 2 )
13:
until S k can not be changed any further; 14: end if 15: end while 16: S uncor = A∈F2 A ∪ S uncor ; 17: return {S 1 , · · · , S k , S uncor }; Proposition 4. Let F m and F I be two families of subsets of W . Algorithm 1 produces a unique partition of S(m) ∪ S(m I ) containing the maximum number of correlated groups.
Proof: The proof is straightforward from the graph-theoretic point of view since the algorithm finds maximal connected components using a standard breadth-first search algorithm.
2
Based on the obtained partition, we only need to consider revision inside each subset S i . For convenience, let focal sets of m included in S i be A 
Note that the denominator is clearly P l(B j i ). This technique can be seen as a kind of conditioning on B j i , i.e.,m j (C)
Evidently, this equation is to some extent similar to the form of Jeffrey's rule. After allocating all fractions of m I (B j i ), 1 ≤ j ≤ t, we are able to sum up all the masses that each subset C receives. This leads to the following definition of a revision operator.
Definition 9. Let m and m I be two mass functions and {S 1 , · · · , S k , S uncor } be the partition of S(m) ∪ S(m I ) obtained from Algorithm 1. For any subset C, if C ⊆ S i , then let t be the number of focal sets of m I contained in S i andm j (C) be defined in Eq. (15), 1 ≤ j ≤ t. Then a revision operator for mass functions is defined asm = m • a m I such thatm
From Algorithm 1, set C does not intersect any focal set included in another element of the partition, so the flowing down process for other elements of the partition does not affect the revised mass value of C. Hencem(C) obtained in Def. 9 is indeed the final result for C. It should be clear that the Jeffrey-Dempster revision and the revision operator of Def. 9 are the same thing. The latter is just another way of computing the former. This finding is significant since these two revision strategies are from different perspectives. Proof: As said earlier,
does not intersect any focal set of m, based on Algorithm 1, B j i is in S uncor (note that the converse is also right, i.e., if a focal set B of m I is in S uncor , then P l(B) = 0), hence the mass value of B j i remains unchanged after revision. This is equivalent to the following condition in Def. 7:
Therefore, we have
Properties of the revision rule for mass functions
In this section, we present some properties of the Jeffrey-Dempster revision. First, we discuss the relationship between our revision rule and Dempster's rule of conditioning. Proof: If P l(E I ) = 0, then it is obvious. If
We can show that the vacuous mass function plays no role in revision: bringing empty information leads to no change. Likewise, if there is no prior information, the input information is accepted as such. 
Furthermore, we can also prove that if prior beliefs and new evidence are in total conflict, then the revision result is simply the latter, thus generalizing the AGM revision rule for epistemic states. Proof Since ∀A ∈ F m , B ∈ F I , A ∩ B = ∅, it must be ∀B ∈ F I , P l(B) = 1. Hence, ∀C = ∅, we have
There is no need for renormalization factor in Dempster rule then. It corresponds to an expansion as the input information does not contradict the output.
Next we show that our revision rule generalizes Jeffrey's rule of combination: 
. Now we discuss two subcases.
• If P l(B V ) = 0, based on Def. 7, then for any
Note that while A ⊆ D V , it must hold that A ∩ B V = ∅ since P l(B V ) = 0. So there cannot be, via this construction, a focal set ofm that intersects B V . So, P l(B V ) = 0 in any case. Then, based on Def. 7, immediately we havem(V ) = 0 if V = B V andm(B V ) = m I (B V ), which impliesm(V ) =m(V ).
• If P l(B V ) > 0, then we havê 
Darwiche and Pearl
6 proposed four postulates on iterated belief revision, the first of which (written in set-theoretic notation) is C1: If E I ⊆ F I , then (E • F I ) • E I ≡ E • E I Proposition 11 can be seen as a generalization of the above iterated belief revision postulate, where the condition E I ⊆ F I is changed into a simple refinement condition on input partitions. This result includes the case when the partitioned mass function m I is a specialisation of the partitioned mass m I , but it does not require it.
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The second postulate reads:
The complement m of a mass function m is obtained as ∀E ⊆ W, m(E) = m(E). If F I is a partition made of E I and its complement E I , m I just exchanges the weights of m I , keeping the same partition. Hence if we substitute m I for m I , we are still in the conditions requested by Proposition 11 which thus applies, and generalizes C2 as well. Note that this remark does not apply beyond binary partitions. If m I is a partitioned mass, m I is not (the complements of elements of a partition do not make a partition, in general). So we cannot say that (m • JD m I ) • JD m I = m • JD m I using this proposition, beyond binary partitions, since Proposition 11 has a restricted scope to inputs of the form of partitioned mass functions. Extending this result beyond this case is a matter of further research.
Conclusion
Although belief revision in probability theory is fully studied, revision strategies in evidence theory have seldom been addressed. In this paper, we have investigated the issue of revision strategies for mass functions so as to generalize Jeffrey's rule from probability to belief functions. We have tried to express two basic requirements for the revision of belief functions, that seem to be universally valid as revision principles, and hold for Jeffrey's rule: success postulate and minimal change. Moreover, since the natural revision rule of a belief function by a sure fact is Dempster rule of conditioning, we required that the appropriate revision rule also extends Dempster rule of conditioning. Moreover, in case of inconsistency we have proposed using a revision method in the spirit of the AGM theory, respecting the success postulate. We have been led to first extend Dempster rule of conditioning to this case.
We have surveyed the existing literature, where several extensions of Jeffrey's revision rule have been proposed. Only one of them due to Ichiashi and Tanaka, generalizes Dempster conditioning. But none of them can bear total conflict with any focal set of the input information. As a consequence we have extended the definition in order to cover this case and called the obtained revision rule Jeffrey-Dempster revision. Its peculiarity is to accept any kind of belief functions as input, contrary to other past proposals by Smets and Halpern. The paid price is that the Jeffrey-style minimal change postulate holds in a strong form only for special kinds of inputs. However the success postulate is respected as the posterior mass is a specialisation of the input. In case of strong consistency with the prior belief function, the revision rule coincides with Dempster rule of combination, which generalizes the reduction of the AGM revision to a symmetric conjunctive merging called expansion when the input is consistent with the prior information. We have proposed an algorithm to compute the result of a Jeffrey-Dempster revision.
We have seen that when the inputs are successive partitioned mass functions, two known postulates of iterated belief revision due to Darwiche and Pearl still hold. This point suggests further research should be carried out to study more properties of iterating the JeffreyDempster revision rule. Moreover, various proposals exist for the revision of ranked epis-
